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Abstract
In this paper, I offer a possible evolutionary explanation for the existence of
religion and for its ubiquity. I suggest that religion evolved in modern humans through
the conflation of two essential characteristics of Homo sapiens sapiens. The first, social
hierarchy, is observed in all social primates-indeed, in all socially-living animals. The
second, cognitive fluidity, appears to be unique to our species. Religion resulted from
cognitively-fluid modern humans' attempt to relate to the ecological environment using
strategies derived from the social environment: humans viewed environmental stressors
and forces as humanlike, and attempted to relate to them in humanlike ways. This
position represents a synthesis of ideas presented by researchers such as Steven Mithen
and Stewart Elliott Guthrie. With the example of the development of the Rastafari
religion in Jamaica, I attempt to demonstrate the adaptive advantage of religion: religious
group identity is adaptively beneficial because it redefines and reinforces networks of
altruism in times of increased environmental stress, increasing the overall fitness of group
members. After examining potential weaknesses in the theses of the paper, I suggest a
possible method of testing them. I conclude that religion's emergence in human culture
is likely due to the above-mentioned characteristics, and that religion has been
maintained due to the adaptive advantage it bestows.

Max A. Taylor

The Evolutionary Basis and Function of Religion
Thesis
In this paper, I offer a possible evolutionary explanation for the existence of
religion and for its ubiquity. I suggest that religion evolved in modern humans through
the conflation of two essential characteristics of Homo sapiens sapiens. The first, social
hierarchy, is observed in all social primates-indeed, in all socially-living animals. The
second, cognitive fluidity, appears to be unique to our species. Religion resulted from
cognitively-fluid modern humans' attempt to relate to the ecological environment using
strategies derived from the social environment. This position represents a synthesis of
ideas presented by researchers such as Steven Mithen and Stewart Elliott Guthrie. With
the example of the development of the Rastafari religion in Jamaica, I attempt to
demonstrate the adaptive advantage of religion: religious group identity is adaptively
beneficial because it redefines and reinforces networks of altruism in times of increased
environmental stress, increasing the overall fitness of group members.

I. The emergence of religion

The question of religion as adaptation
Religion is a true cultural universal. All known human social groups have
religious beliefs and practices, and it appears likely that religion is as old as Homo

sapiens sapiens. Although the content of particular religions exhibits great diversity
cross-culturally, religion as a phenomenon seems to be a fundamental part of the
cognitive equipment of all modern human populations. It may therefore be worthwhile to
consider, as Edward O. Wilson and others have done, the evolutionary biological basis of

2

religion as a human characteristic (Wilson 1978, Reynolds and Tanner 1995). Religion's
continued existence, as well as the continual emergence of new religious groups in all
parts of the world, may admit the possibility that, rather than being simply a byproduct of
the evolutionary history of the human mind, religion actually has served an adaptive role.
If religion can be understood through the lens of evolution, it may be possible to identify
its role by examining both the universal aspects of religion and the circumstances
surrounding the emergence of new religious groups, and then relating these factors to
individual adaptive advantage.
The problem of what is meant by "religion"

Vernon Reynolds observes that all human societies have religious ideas (1986).
However, this observation is not unproblematic. For one thing, the question of what sorts
of ideas we can accurately call "religious" is not easily answered. In the modern world,
religion does not occupy the same amount of , room' in all cultures; a wide range of
diversity exists among cultures in the degree to which religion is integrated into the
overalllifeway. In some cultures, it is difficult to tell where the line is between what is
regarded as 'religious' and what is not; or that line may not exist (Reynolds 1986). In
other cultures, clear, relatively nonporous divisions separate the sacred from the secular
(Reynolds 1986). Other cultures position themselves at a variety of intermediate states
between these two extremes.
To answer the question of what we can consider a "religious" idea, the
relationship between religious ideas and religious behaviors must be considered.
Although there may be great variation in the behavior of any two members of the same
religious group, religious ideas do predicate certain behaviors. An understanding of
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religion as an adaptive strategy can only be approached by focusing on practices and
behaviors rather than precepts associated with religion, since it is behaviors and not ideas
that directly affect differential survival and reproduction (after Reynolds and Tanner
1995).
Religious universals

Difficulties in determining exactly what is "religious" about a particular culture,
or about culture in general, can be addressed by seeking to define universal
characteristics shared by all religions regardless of the culture in which they are found.
Steven Mithen identifies four elements of religion which he describes as
"of greatest signiftcance to that way of thinking which we call religious:
(1) the belief in non-physical beings; (2) the belief that a non-physical
component of a person may survive after death; (3) the belief that certain
people within a society are likely to receive direct inspiration of messages
from supernatural agencies, such as gods or spirits; (4) the belief that
performing certain rituals in an exact way can bring about change in the
natural world" (1999, p. 149).
Mithen also identifies the use of material symbols, "images of supernatural beings, or
symbols of those beings and the ideas about the world that they represent," as another
important universal element of religion (1999).
Mithen's (1) (belief in nonphysical beings) and (2) (belief in a nonphysical,
continued existence after death) are problematic, since there are religions in which they
are either not present or not emphasized. Buddhism and Rastafari, for example,
originally emphasized neither belief, although individual Buddhists and Rastas today may
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believe either or both of them (see Barrett 1997, Lake 1998, Wint 1998, Broom 2003).
However, Mithen's (3) (belief in communication between human and supernatural
agencies) and (4) (belief in the efficacy of ritual for controlling the environment) are
emphatically present in all existing human religions, as is the use of material symbols.
Stewart Elliott Guthrie identifies animism (the tendency to attribute life to
nonliving objects or phenomena) and anthropomorphism (the tendency to attribute human
characteristics to nonhuman objects or phenomena) as religious universals (1993).
Guthrie's universals are preferable to Mithen's (1) and (2), since they are found even in
religions that do not emphasize Mithen's first two characteristics. Guthrie argues that
animism and anthropomorphism are by no means peculiar to religion; he gives numerous
examples of their prevalence in everyday life, in the imagery of advertisements, the
language of psychology and even in the findings of physicists (1993). He identifies
animism and anthropomorphism as persistent tendencies in all systems of human thought,
including science, art, "common sense," and religion (1993, p. 194).
Another universal characteristic may be found in the fact that religion appears to
concern itself with a specific suite of phenomena in all cultures; in other words, all
religions share a central body oflife events, or "nodal points," which they inform in all
cultures (Reynolds and Tanner 1995). These nodal points include such life events as
reproduction, child raising, food and diet, warfare, disease, and death (Reynolds and
Tanner 1995). To define it more generally, religion addresses all those events in life
which involve a high degree of uncertainty or risk (Reynolds and Tanner 1995).
One final characteristic of all religions is their ideological nature. Ideology here
refers to a set of ideas or beliefs that is adhered to by a specific social group and which
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motivates specific actions such as warfare (after LeBlanc 2004). Religions do not merely
influence people's thought; they guide individuals' behavior. As Reynolds and Tanner
emphasize, "religions have always had practical concerns" (1995). These concerns are
not merely dealt with in the realm of abstract thought; they are directly or indirectly
addressed through the practice of religion.
The evolutionary origin of religion

The universal characteristics of religion identified by Mithen and Guthrie suggest
an evolutionary basis for religion in Homo sapiens sapiens. Perhaps religion developed
in our species through the conflation of our tendency for social hierarchy with our
capacity for cognitive fluidity, or cross-communication between the mental domains in
our brains as evidenced by the appearance of material symbols in the archaeological
record. Cognitive fluidity enabled early modern humans to apply strategies developed
for social hierarchy as a response to environmental forces by viewing these forces
through the lens of anthropomorphism, allowing humans a method for attempting to
control them. It enabled early modern humans to successfully negotiate the ecological
and social environments in times of duress by manipulating networks of altruism.
Religion thus provided early modern humans with an adaptive advantage over other
hominid species such as Homo sapiens neandertalensis, who apparently did not possess
religion and consequently were unable to effectively manipulate altruistic behavior.
The adaptiveness of cognitive fluidity

Mithen identifies the capacity for symbolism as a universal human trait (1999).
The capacity for symbolism is, as far as we know, a unique characteristic of humans;
other animals, including the other social primates, do not appear to have the cognitive
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capacity to mentally process objects and events which are not physically present (Mithen
1999). Although the human monopoly on symbolic thought is not above question, it is
widely accepted, and no conclusive evidence has yet been found to discredit it.
Symbolism is omnipresent in religion, both in the form of mental symbols for religious
concepts and in the form of physical representations of supernatural beings or concepts
(Mit hen 1999).
Mental and material symbolism are made possible due to a unique capability of

Homo sapiens sapiens: cognitive fluidity, which is the ability to integrate information
and informational processes from different "cognitive domains", bundles of interacting
mental models which are used to process complex information in specific fields (Mithen
1996). The cognitive landscapes of early hominids, including all members of the genus

Homo, have been described by Mithen as consisting of three distinct, specialized
cognitive domains, the social, the technical, and "natural history," which contains
information about the ecological environment (Mithen 1996). Symbolism does not
appear to be possible in the absence of cognitive fluidity (Mithen 1999).
Mithen proposes that modern humans are unique among species of the genus

Homo in that we can process information from one cognitive domain in another, and
information from multiple domains can be synthesized (1999). He supports this proposal
by his analysis of the archaeological record, which demonstrates that species such as

Homo sapiens neandertalensis were like modern humans in some aspects of their
material culture, but were more like earlier hominids in others (1996). Mithen attributes
this variation to a lack of cognitive fluidity (1999). For example, the stone tool
technology of Neanderthals exhibits superior design when compared to Upper Paleolithic
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technology, demonstrating the competence of Neanderthals in the technical domain
(Mithen 1999). However, there is no evidence that Neanderthals ever used these stone
tools to make specialized hunting weapons such as spears, indicating a lack of
communication between the technical and natural-history domains (Mithen 1999). There
is also no strong evidence that Neanderthals ever used their technical prowess to create
material goods with social applications, such as body decoration or grave goods,
indicating a lack of connection between the technical and social domains (Mithen 1999).
Although the possibility of cognitive fluidity among Neanderthals cannot be definitively
ruled out (indeed, it has been suggested), there is no incontrovertible evidence to suggest
that they shared this ability with modern humans.
The adaptive value of cognitive fluidity to Homo sapiens sapiens is inestimable.
With it, modern humans have able to achieve technologies and social arrangements that
are far more complex and subtle than those achieved by our closest relatives in the genus.
Significantly, the first evidence of cognitive fluidity appears in the archaeological record
simultaneously with the probable development of language and the first indisputable
evidence of material symbolism (and therefore mental symbolism), which is necessary
for religion (Mithen 1996). The emergence of cognitive fluidity among modern humans
can explain the cultural explosion of the Upper Paleolithic: Homo sapiens sapiens,
unlike our predecessors, was able to integrate the various domains of information,
enabling us to adopt innovative survival strategies and vastly increasing our survival and
reproductive success (Mithen 1999). Cognitive fluidity may have been the secret weapon
that ensured the ascendance of Homo sapiens sapiens, allowing our species to out-survive
and out-reproduce Homo sapiens neandertalensis.
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The adaptiveness of animism and anthropomorphism
Guthrie identifies animism and anthropomorphism as universal characteristics of
all religions (1993). Guthrie observes that animism, the tendency to attribute life to
nonliving things, is not unique to humans; many lower animals, such as horses and cats,
also react to unknown objects and forces as though they represented living beings (1993).
Guthrie argues that animism is an adaptive strategy because it causes creatures to react
more cautiously to their environments, thus increasing their likelihood of survival; he
uses the example of a hiker who mistakes a boulder for a bear, contrasting him to a hiker
who mistakes a bear for a boulder (1993). Overestimating danger is obviously a safer
strategy than underestimating danger; animism, Guthrie states, is the biological
expression of the principle, "better safe than sorry" (1993).
Guthrie also identifies anthropomorphism, the tendency to attribute human
identity to nonhuman things, as an adaptive trait in human populations (1993).
Anthropomorphism is adaptive in the same way that animism is; for modern humans,
Guthrie argues, the most significant danger to human life was presented by other humans
(1993) "We animate and anthropomorphize," he says, "because, when we see something
as alive or humanlike, we can take precautions," such as stalking it, fleeing, or trying to
establish a social relationship with it (1993, p. 5). While animism is obviously possible
in the absence of cognitive fluidity, given its presence in animals other than humans,
anthropomorphism requires the ability to think and behave symbolically, and to attribute
this ability to other beings (1993). This attribution forms the core of the religious way of
understanding the world.
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The adaptiveness of social hierarchy

Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson argue for the universality of hierarchy in
human social groups (1997). As they observe, social hierarchy is a characteristic of all
social primates, including modern humans (Somit and Peterson 1997). Social hierarchy
takes the form of relationships of dominance and submission, with their accompanying
behaviors, which actually confer adaptive advantage to individuals within a social group
(Somit and Peterson 1997). This adaptive advantage obtains in the normalizing of social
life. As Somit and Peterson observe, "Dominance furthers predictability, and
predictability ... benefits both the dominant and the subordinate" (1997, p. 54). By
creating a predictable social environment, hierarchy minimizes intergroup conflict and
enhances individuals' prospects for reproduction and for successful child-raising (Somit
and Peterson 1997).
One important element of Somit and Peterson's analysis of the adaptive value of
dominance lies in its recognition that hierarchy can be of benefit to subordinate
individuals (1997). Through strategies such as submission displays (and praise of
dominant individuals, in the case of humans), subordinate individuals can manipulate the
social contracts created by hierarchy to ensure their own survival (Burkert 1996). The
use of submission as a survival strategy has been observed among many social primates,
including gorillas and chimpanzees (Burkert 1996). Submission displays serve to prevent
aggression from the dominant individual, and can also be used to gain his or her
protection or help (Burkert 1996). Submission displays among lower primates are often
strikingly familiar to those used by humans, including such actions as genuflecting,
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prostration, bowing the head, and avoiding direct eye contact (Burkert 1996). This
behavioral similarity between chimpanzees and humans as social primates cannot be
satisfactorily explained by any other means than by reference to our shared evolutionary
history.
Religion as evolutionary synthesis

An evolutionary explanation for the appearance and maintenance of religion can
now be presented. As animals, we have long possessed the tendency to animate, since
natural selection has favored animism due to its survival-enhancing effect (Guthrie 1993).
As social primates, we have certainly always lived in social groups. Part of the
evolutionary legacy of social living is a tendency toward hierarchical social structure,
since natural selection has favored hierarchy due to its inclusive-fitness enhancing effect
(Somit and Peterson 1997). With the appearance of our species, we gained the capacity
for cognitive fluidity, which gave us among other advantages the ability to symbolize and
to synthesize information from separate cognitive domains (Mithen 1999).
The development of symbolic thought transformed our capacity to animate into
our capacity to anthropomorphize. In addition to attributing life to unknown objects and
forces, we now attributed to them consciousness, the capacity for symbolic thought, and
the capacity for social interaction-in other words, we now attributed human identity to
them. The synthesis of the ecological domain (as ecological forces) with the social
domain (as human identity), accomplished through anthropomorphism, produced the first
concepts of the supernatural. Further processing of this innovation in the social domain
presented us with the strategy of creating social relationships with these forces. We did
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this in a hierarchical fashion, relating to these humanized environmental forces through
rituals of submission in an attempt to dissuade them from harming us.

II. The adaptive role of religion
Adaptive effects of religion
If religion arose as a byproduct of the development of cognitive fluidity in
modern humans, it was not a superfluous byproduct, but had an immediate adaptive
impact on early modern humans. Religion has impacted the course of human evolution
by influencing the expression of a wide range of behaviors such as reproduction, food
strategies, altruism, and aggression (Reynolds 1986, Reynolds and Tanner 1995, Qirko
2002, LeBlanc 2004). Religion encourages certain behaviors and discourages others, and
thereby has an impact on the differential survival and reproduction of individuals. Robert
Boyd and Peter 1. Richerson argue that, since humans are both biological and cultural
organisms, our cultural practices have affected our biological development (1985). The
effects of religious ideology, a cultural phenomenon, on the genetic identities of
populations can therefore be seen as an example the operation of a mechanism of dualinheritance (Boyd and Richerson 1985).
Religion's universal concern with nodal points highlights its role in control of the
ecological environment. In every culture, life events which involve a high degree of risk
or uncertainty (such as events connected with reproduction and acquiring food) are
mediated by religion (Reynolds and Tanner 1995). Ritual and communication with the
forces regulating these events are religious behaviors for manipulating their outcomes.
Humans tend to preserve effective survival strategies by encoding them culturally;
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although not all cultural elements contribute to increased success in survival or
reproduction, many do. Effective survival strategies which are not simple biological
predispositions are taught and reinforced culturally. Religion has been maintained by
natural selection because it is effective in influencing differential survival and
reproduction. It does this through the manipulation of networks of altruism.
Religion and altruism

Religious strategies which help humans to successfully negotiate the nodal points
of life can confer an adaptive advantage. The most significant adaptive advantage of
religion is its ability to create new networks of reciprocal altruism or to reinforce existing
ones. By encouraging similarity of behavior among adherents, religions provide
individuals with group identities. This is a consequence of the fact that, for most of its
existence, religious identity has been closely connected with other forms of identity such
as ethnic group, tribal affiliation, and political affiliation (Wilson 1973, Meggers 1983,
LeBlanc 2004). Dennis L. Krebs and Kathy Denton have argued that an individual's
membership in a group positively influences his or her perceptions of other members of
the "in-group" (1997). These positive perceptions increase the likelihood of social
helping and altruistic behavior toward in-group members (Krebs and Denton 1997).
Wilson's analysis of altruism among humans emphasizes the role of kin selection and
inclusive fitness in manifestations of altruistic behavior (1978). Significantly, he
observes that although the capacity for altruistic behavior has a biological basis, the
expression of altruistic behavior is culturally determined (Wilson 1978). Hector Qirko
argues that such practices as institutional celibacy demonstrate the manipulability of
altruistic behavior among humans (2002). He also shows that cultural phenomena such
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as religion can manipulate altruistic behavior by manipulating kinship cues (Qirko 2002).
Through the manipulation of kinship cues, religious identities create in-groups, resulting
in new expressions of in-group altruistic behavior. By encouraging or discouraging
certain behaviors, religion creates similarity among its adherents, which in turn fosters
fictive kinship networks that enhance the inclusive fitness of religious in-group members.
As noted above, throughout most of human prehistory and history the fictive kinships
created by religion would more often have reinforced existing kinship relations than
replaced them (after Wilson 1978, Meggers 1983). As human social complexity
increased, however, group size increased apace, and fictive kinship was extended to
include genetically-unrelated individuals (Chase 1999, LeBlanc 2004).
The emergence of new religious identities

If religion's adaptive role is to enhance altruistic behavior by creating or
reinforcing group identity, it is logical to expect that new religious groups are likely to
emerge when environmental stresses increase. This hypothesis has been proposed by
Max Weber and Ann Ruth Miller, and it is exactly what is observed throughout history;
whenever humans perceive ourselves to be falling below a minimal standard of living
conditions, the formation of new religious identities is a common strategy (in Edmonds
2003). Environmental stresses such as famine and warfare increase the uncertainty and
danger of the nodal points of life (after Reynolds and Tanner 1995). New religious
groups decrease this danger in two ways. First, by allowing people a measure of
perceived control over their uncertain circumstances, religion lessens their impact; as
Krebs and Denton observe, a positive mentality can have real effects on an individual's
survival (and consequently, on his or her reproductive success) (1997). Second, and
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more importantly from a biological point of view, the new religious group redefines the
networks of reciprocal altruism, concentrating altruistic behaviors within the group and
thereby increasing the average fitness of all group members.
III. Ethnographic example: Rastafari in Jamaica
Environmental stresses in Jamaica

From its earliest beginnings in the sixteenth century, the black experience in
Jamaica was one of hardship, slavery, and oppression (see Campbell 1987, Lake 1998).
Even after the British Act of Emancipation ended slavery in Jamaica in 1833, the living
conditions of black people in Jamaica remained impoverished (Lake 1998). Much as in
the post-Civil War American South, political and economic oppression of Jamaican black
people resulted in low wages and chronic underemployment, keeping the majority of
Jamaicans in conditions no better than during slavery (Lake 1998). Economic
marginalization left black Jamaicans disproportionately vulnerable to starvation and
disease, as evidenced by the cholera epidemic in 1850 which killed between 25,00030,000 Africans (Lake 1998, p. 27). The Jamaican colonial government, completely
unsympathetic to the suffering of African-descended people, responded to their attempts
to improve their living conditions through labor strikes by replacing black workers with
indentured servants from China, Syria, and India, furthering black impoverishment (Lake
1998). Military repression was the colonial government's response to any protest
(Campbell 1987). The position of black people throughout Jamaica worsened steadily
throughout the early 20th century, culminating in a revolt which originated among sugarplantation workers and erupted into large-scale rebellion throughout the island from
January-June 1938 (Campbell 1987). The 1938 Sufferers' Rebellion resulted in the
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deaths of many black women, men, and children as Jamaican police and British army
forces responded to unarmed protestors with rifles and machine guns (Campbell 1987).
Although it ended in defeat for the rebels, the Sufferers' Rebellion had a lasting impact:
it presented the first pan-Jamaican challenge to colonial hegemony, uniting Africandescended people throughout Jamaica and leading to an increased emphasis on African
identity in Jamaican politics (Campbell 1987).

The emergence and development of Rastafari
Under such harsh conditions one would not be surprised to see new religious
group identities appear in attempts to mediate the grave hardships faced by African
Jamaicans. Indeed, several religious groups emerged in Jamaica, both during slavery
th

days and in the late 19 century (Barrett 1997). These groups, including the Pukkumina,
the Revivalist movement, and the Revival Zion Church, all were syncretist in nature,
blending African religious traditions with Protestant beliefs actively diffused from
English colonialists (Barrett 1997).
Rastafari, which first appeared in Jamaica in the early 1930s, is distinct from the
Jamaican syncretist religions in that from its inception it emphasized African identity,
privileging it above the cultural hegemony of the European colonialist minority (Murrell
1998). This emphasis stemmed from the influence of Marcus Garvey, a journalist,
businessman, and political activist born in Jamaica in 1887 who promoted African rights
in the Jamaica, the United States, and Central America (Lake 1998). Garvey's platform
included "three primary tenets: 1) racial pride, 2) self-sufficiency of African descended
people, and 3) repatriation of diaspora Africans to Africa" (Lake 1998, p. 29). Though
not a Rasta himself, Garvey's emphasis on black identity, as well as his frequent use of
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Biblical quotations and religious metaphor in describing the plight of Diaspora African
populations, had a profound effect on Rastafari's founders (Campbell 1987).
While Rastafari was influenced by earlier Jamaican syncretic faiths, Garvey's
unintentional influence on the new faith led to a significant break with them in that, rather
than blending religious identities, Rastafari radically redefined them (Murrell and
Williams 1998). Under the leadership of early Rasta leaders such as Leonard Howell,
Archibald Dunkley and Joseph "Teacher" Hibbert, Rastafari reinterpreted the Christian
Bible through the lens of African identity, creating a religious identity distinct from its
predecessors (Murrell and Williams 1998, Campbell 1987). After the failure of the
Sufferers' Rebellion, Rastafari gained in popularity among impoverished rural and urban
black Jamaicans; although Rastas as a group were not active in the rebellion, the
renaissance in black identity politics which followed helped to swell the organization's
numbers (Campbell 1987). By the 1970s, Rastafari had grown from a small, charismatic
cult to a widely-acknowledged cultural presence whose membership included not only
poor but also middle-class and wealthy black Jamaicans (Lake 1998). This growth
occurred by a process referred to by Weber as "routinization," which describes how a
charismatic community's ideas become assimilated into the wider society, increasing
their attractive power (in Edmonds 2003). Due in large part to the proselytizing ofRasta
reggae musicians, Jamaican non-Rastas began to view Rastas as living embodiments of
Jamaican and African culture (Edmonds 2003). This perception led to an explosion in
the acceptance ofRastafari in Jamaica and among other Diaspora populations, as well as
in African populations, to the extent that the worldwide population ofRasta adherents
was estimated in 1997 at one million (Murrell 1998).

17
Rastafari and group identity

Rastafari lends itself particularly well to an analysis of the adaptive role of
religion in directing altruism, because many of its distinctive features are specifically
concerned with the group identity ofRastas and are well known to non-Rastas, primarily
due to the popularity of reggae music (which, ironically, is now disdained by many Rasta
groups) (Lake 1998).
Rastafari can best be described as the apotheosis of African identity (Murrell and
Williams 1998). Rastas emphasize Africans as the chosen people of the Bible, and many
worship Haile Selassie I, former emperor of Ethiopia, as Jah Rastafari, the living God of
all Africans (Lake 1998). Jah is a name for God derived from the Hebrew YHVH; the
term Rastafari comes from Selassie's pre-coronation personal name, Ras (Prince) Lij
Tafari Makonnen (Wint 1998). In a process similar to the development of ideas of Jesus
Christ in Christianity, Selassie's identity and nature have been redefined by Rastas so that
his death in 1975 did nothing to decrease his image as the living God of all Africans;
some Rastas denied his death, while most represented it as Selassie's transformation from
a physical to a non-physical being (Barrett 1975). Though not all Rastas agree with
Selassie's divine nature, almost all identifY him as a spiritual leader, despite the fact that
Selassie himself was a Coptic Christian and not a Rasta (Lake 1998).
Group identity among Rastas is reinforced through many avenues. Use of kinship
terms among Rastas is ubiquitous; male Rastas are referred to as "brethren," while female
Rastas are "sistren" or "daughters" (Lake 1998). Many Jamaican Rasta groups, such as
the Bobo Shanti and the Nyabingi, live on communes (Lake 1998). Rasta identity is
further reinforced through the use of distinctive language patterns. The Roman numeral
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"I" in Selassie's royal name is interpreted as the personal pronoun "I" and replaces
syllables in many words in Rasta speech such as "Ital" (vital) and "Iration" (creation)
(Lake 1998 p. 104). Religious rules regarding clean ("Ital") and unclean foods
distinguish Rastas from non-Rastas; Rasta dietary rules emphasize eating natural,
unprocessed foods (Lake 1998) Rastas typically are forbidden from eating all meat
except for fish, do not drink alcohol, and may not eat processed foods such as cheese or
white flour products (Lake 1998). The use of marijuana as a medicine and as a
meditation and prayer aid also once distinguished Rastas in Jamaica (Barrett 1997).
Though not adopted by the earliest Rasta groups, the wearing of beards and dreadlocks
by men and of dreadlocks, head coverings and long skirts by women distinguishes many
(though not all) Rasta groups today (Lake 1998). Rastas identify these practices as
indicative of African identity, sometimes in spite of the fact that certain Rasta practices
(particularly the language patterns and dietary rules) are not found in Africa (Lake 1998).
It should be noted that the use of marijuana was among the first Rasta practices to be
routinized and adopted by non-Rastas in Jamaica; though obviously never a uniquely
Rasta practice, marijuana use in Jamaica is much more prevalent now among non-Rastas
than it was previously (Lake 1998). The wearing of dreadlocks, too, appears to be
undergoing a process of routinization. Lake attributes both of these routinizations to the
increased popularity of reggae music, which since the late 1960s has been dominated by
artists claiming Rasta identity (Lake 1998).
The above-mentioned characteristics of Rastafari are consistent with its role in
creating a new group identity that benefits the fitness of its members. Use of specialized
language and kinship terms, the wearing of beards and dreadlocks by men and head
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coverings and skirts by women, observance of dietary laws, and communal living all
function toward the end of supporting the cohesion of Rastas as a group; these behaviors
are motivated by the Rasta ideology, which emphasizes the identity ofRastas as Mricans.
The group identity fostered by Rastafari, which arose in response to the environment of
oppression black people encountered in Jamaica, has served to increase reciprocal
altruism among Rastas, increasing their individual fitness; for this reason it has been
maintained, and has grown. It is interesting to note, as Lake does, that these
characteristics (communal living, specialized language and kinship terminology, dietary
rules, and so forth) are most strongly emphasized among the Bobo Shanti and the
Nyabingi, who draw their membership primarily from Jamaica's lowest economic classes
(1998). The Twelve Tribes group, whose membership includes middle- and upper-class
Jamaicans as well as the majority of non-Jamaican Rastas, does not encourage group
living, and has much laxer dietary rules (Lake 1998).

IV. Issues
Many of the assumptions on which this paper builds are not above question. It
could be proven that humans are not alone in our possession of the faculty for symbolic
thought. It is already known that humans are not the only animals who animate nonliving objects and phenomena; Guthrie gives the example of chimpanzees in Mrica
reacting to an approaching thunderstorm in exactly the same manner as they react to an
approaching predator, by making threat displays (1993). However, if it is true that other
animals share our faculty for symbolic thought, this would not diminish the importance of
symbolic thought in the evolutionary development of culture (including religion) in
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humans; rather, it would raise the question of whether "culture" is really a uniquely
human domain.
If it were proven that Neanderthals possessed cognitive fluidity as modern
humans do, the usefulness of the concept would be called into question. A few
Neanderthal burial sites have been found which may have been the results of intentional
burial due to the degree of preservation of remains (Mithen 1999). However, only one of
these sites contains something that might be interpreted as a grave good, a single deer
tooth, which might easily due to an accidental deposition (Mithen 1999). Mithen argues
that none of the so-called Neanderthal grave goods show evidence of intentional,
cognitively-tluid symbolic thought or behavior; indeed, no artifact that predates the
appearance of modern humans suggests it (1999). Until more evidence is found, then,

Homo sapiens sapiens must remain the only species which can confidently be identified
as possessing the capacity for cognitive fluidity.
This paper has proposed that religion has been maintained among human
populations because it allows us to mitigate perceived environmental stresses by creating
new networks for reciprocal altruism and by reinforcing existing ones. This proposition
is open to falsification because it predicts that in times of increased perceived
environmental stress, two things will happen: (1) new religious groups will appear; (2)
members of existing religious groups will more heavily emphasize religious identity.
The historical origins of religions attest to the validity of prediction (1), but this hardly
constitutes compelling proof, and says nothing about prediction (2). However, both
predictions are capable of being examined (and falsified or confirmed) by careful
ethnographic research. A good place to start might be by comparing the rates of
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emergence of new religious groups in times of perceived stress and in times of stability;
if it should be found that new religious groups emerge at a comparable rate regardless of
perceived environmental stress, the evolutionary function of religion proposed in this
paper would be rendered unlikely. However, perceived environmental stress does not
only cause new religious movements to arise; it can also give way to an increased
emphasis on existing religious identities. This proposition is less easily quantifiable, but
it could be examined and supported (or falsified) through ethnographic fieldwork and
interviews. If it were found that perceived environmental stress did not lead to an
increased emphasis on religious identity within a cultural group, then this paper's thesis
would be undermined.

v.

Conclusion

1 conclude that religion originally developed in humans as a byproduct of the
development of cognitive fluidity: religion resulted from the application of social
strategies (such as submission displays) to environmental problems, as viewed through
the lenses of animism and anthropomorphism. Our ancestors viewed environmental
phenomena such as earthquakes and storms as alive and humanlike, and in order to lessen
their impact they related to these anthropomorphized phenomena in the same manner that
they did to more powerful humans-through dominance and submission, the strategies of
social hierarchy.
Religion has been maintained as part of humans' cognitive makeup because it
effectively lessens environmental stress, though not through actual communication with
environmental or 'supernatural' forces. Rather, religion mitigates that stress by
reinforcing networks of reciprocal altruism or creating new networks-membership in a
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religious in-group entitles an individual to assistance from other members of the ingroup, increasing that individual's fitness. This does not imply that religious identities
are created by people as a conscious survival strategy-quite the opposite. Religion, like
other human behaviors which encourage group cohesion, is a part of our evolutionary
heritage, and stems ultimately from our nature as social creatures. For humans, as for all
social animals, individual survival and fitness depend on group membership.
The Rastafari religion is discussed here as an example of some of the ways
religion creates and reinforces group identities. Though not all religious groups
accomplish those goals in the same way that Rastafari does, all religious groups use the
same strategies (such as manipulation of kinship cues) to do so. Human groups have
used religion to mitigate environmental stresses throughout our history (and probably our
prehistory as well); we have done do because it works, and so we are very likely to
continue doing so in the future.
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